ABSTRACT To reduce the secrecy loss due to the correlation between main and wiretap channels, this paper introduces a cooperative jamming relay to degrade the reception at the eavesdropper. We consider slowfading multiple-input-single-output wiretap channels with a passive single-antenna eavesdropper, where full information for the channels to the legitimate receiver and statistical information for the channels to the eavesdropper is available. By deploying the cooperative jamming relay reasonably, the correlation between the channels from the introduced relay to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper can be much below than that between the main and wiretap channels. Thus, the relay can interfere with the eavesdropper more effectively than the traditional scheme of artificial noise-aided beamforming at the transmitter. The simulation results demonstrate that the secrecy outage probability under the transmit power and target secrecy rate constraints is reduced substantially.
I. INTRODUCTION
WITH the approach of the so-called big data era, expansive wireless communication networks as critical data contributors have naturally caused increasing uneasiness regarding data security [1] , [2] . Due to the broadcast nature of radio propagation, wireless communication is particularly vulnerable to eavesdropping and impersonation attacks. As an alternative to the traditional high-complexity cryptography-based secrecy methods, physical layer security (PHY-security) techniques have attracted considerable attention [3] . In PHY-security, the inherent randomness of wireless channels is exploited to guarantee confidentiality with proper coding and signal processing, ensuring that only the legitimate receiver can decode confidential messages [4] .
Although PHY-security has developed a substantial number of mathematical theories, technologies and algorithms
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to effectively address security threats, most works focus on the scenario whereby the main and wiretap channels are independent of each other. For many of these works, signal processing techniques are employed to increase the received signal quality difference between the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper [5] . In particular, beamforming can enhance the signal quality at the legitimate receiver while limiting that at the eavesdropper. Artificial noise (AN) is often inserted into the transmitted signal to degrade the reception at the eavesdropper. In [6] , AN is inserted into only the null space of the main channel with an isotropic distribution to avoid jamming the reception at the legitimate receiver. Reference [7] proves that AN in the null space of the main channel must be symmetric to maximize the secrecy when the main and wiretap channels are independent of each other. When the desired signal is transmitted in the direction of the main channel and AN is uniformly generated in the null space of the main channel, [8] derives a closed-form expression for power allocation for minimizing the secrecy outage probability.
Nevertheless, the scheme that AN is partially placed in the null space of the main channel is not optimal because when AN is placed in the direction of the main channel beside the null space, the net secrecy rate may increase despite interference with the legitimate receiver. Even so, this scheme is still a simple and effective method, especially when the optimization objective is to maximize the secrecy rate under the secrecy outage constraint [9] . Another common technique for improving confidential transmission is the use of relay systems, which can provide additional spatial degrees of freedom via antennas at the relays [10] , [11] . In secrecy applications, relays can not only help forward data to the legitimate receiver but also emit AN or jamming signals to disrupt the reception at the eavesdropper [12] - [18] . Moreover, relay systems can use full duplex to improve the secrecy [19] , [20] . In addition to relays, base station (BS) in a cellular network can also serve as a cooperative jammer to interfere with the eavesdroppers [21] .
However, there exist scenarios whereby the main and eavesdropper channels are correlated, with the correlation largely depending on the antenna deployment, the proximity of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, and the scatter around them [10] . Because of this correlation, the security performance may suffer a significant decline. Unfortunately, AN-aided beamforming techniques at the transmitter and blind growth of signal power play a limited role in reducing the secrecy loss [12] . To the best of our knowledge, only a few works have tried to strengthen the secrecy under such adverse conditions. Reference [22] presents a scheme in which transmitted antenna selection is performed at the base station and the best relay is chosen for better transmission security. Reference [12] proposes the idea that secrecy can be enhanced by opportunistically transmitting messages in time slots instead of using excessively large signal power. In particular, confidential transmission occurs when the main channel has better instantaneous channel gain than that of the eavesdropper channel. To maximize the secrecy, power is allocated via a water-filling strategy in the time domain, whereby more power is transmitted in time slots when the channel exhibits a high signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) and less power is sent in time slots with a poor SNR. Clearly, [12] does not eliminate the fundamental problem resulting from the correlation; rather, it improves only the usage efficiency of the transmitted power. Additionally, for delay-limited applications, the encoding over multiple channel states adopted in [12] may not be acceptable since it may incur long delays [15] . Reference [23] further studies the impact of both channel correlation and outdated relay selection on the secrecy performance. Most notably, a full-duplex legitimate receiver can also transmit AN in order to create interference to the eavesdropper, and this strategy is highly desirable when the main and eavesdropper channels are correlated [24] . For the scenario of correlated main and eavesdropper channels, it is clear that no study has focused on strategies for cooperative jamming relay. This paper studies strategies for cooperative jamming relay to reduce the secrecy loss for correlated multiple-inputsingle-output (MISO) wiretap channels with a passive singleantenna eavesdropper. This work distinguishes itself from the existing literature as follows: 1) we build a channel model of correlated MISO wiretap channels. Based on this model, we discuss how the correlation affects the secrecy and conclude the traditional scheme of AN-aided beamforming at the transmitter has limited ability to improve the secrecy. 2) To overcome the secrecy degradation, the scheme of cooperative jamming relay is employed. By deploying the cooperative jamming relay reasonably, more favorable conditions for emitting AN to disrupt the reception at the eavesdropper are created. Then, the power allocation between the information-bearing signal at the transmitter and the AN at the relay is optimized.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the system model of cooperative jamming relay for correlated MISO wiretap channels and problem formulation. In Section III, we specify the proposed scheme of cooperative jamming relay for confidential transmission. In contrast, the traditional scheme of AN-aided beamforming is also investigated in our model. Section IV presents simulations. Section V provides the conclusions of this work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first present the system model of cooperative jamming relay for correlated MISO wiretap channels. Then, we provide the formulation of our interested optimization problem. Fig. 1 shows a MISO wiretap channel model whereby the transmitter (Alice) sends confidential messages to the legitimate receiver (Bob) in the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve). In addition, we assume that Eve is also a system user, who surrounds Bob without sufficient authority to acquire the confidential content. Thus, Eve has the same device complexity as Bob. The channels from Alice to Bob and Eve are assumed to be highly correlated. To reduce the secrecy loss due to the correlation, a cooperative jamming relay (Relay) is introduced to degrade the reception at Eve. Note here Relay acts as 
A. SYSTEM MODEL
where x ∈ C N a ×1 and v ∈ C N r ×1 are the transmitted signal and AN vectors, respectively, and the total transmitted power is limited by P. h a and g a denote the channel gain vectors from Alice to Bob and Eve with h a ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ab I) and g a ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ae I) assumed. Similarly, h r and g r denote the channel gain vectors from Alice to Bob and Eve with h r ∼ CN (0, σ 2 rb I) and g r ∼ CN (0, σ 2 re I) assumed. n b and n e denote the additive noise at Bob and Eve, respectively, with n b ∼ CN (0, 1) and n e ∼ CN (0, 1) assumed. Note that the path loss related to the distance is modeled as positiondependent channel gain variance and that the power of the additive noise is normalized for simplification. We can construct the transmitted signal at Alice as
where θ denotes the fraction of P allocated to the informationbearing signal. u representing a beamformer is designed as u = h a /|h a |, by which the transmitted signal is directed at Bob and the average secrecy capacity can be maximized when Eve's CSI is unknown to Alice [25] . When AN is not orthogonal to the direction towards Bob, the net secrecy rate may still increase despite interference with Bob. Even so, it is still a simple and effective scheme to place AN only in the null space of the direction towards Bob, which can be expressed as h H r v = 0. Moreover, the power of AN in the null space is often distributed symmetrically and isotropically [7] . Thus, AN emitted by Relay is generated as
where U consists of a set of orthonormal base vectors for the null space of h r and z ∼ CN (0, I N r −1 ).
In the specific regional scope of a wireless environment, wireless channels between different users may be associated with each other, the extent of which often depends on the distance between users and the scatter around them. In our model, to intercept more confidential information, Eve may actively approach Bob to increase the correlation between h a and g a because the distances from Alice to Bob and from Alice to Eve are far greater than that between Bob and Eve, which may result in a similar signal path. Due to the high correlation, the difference between the main and wiretap channels is very small. We use the correlation coefficient denoted by ρ a to measure the degree of correlation between h a and g a , which is defined as
where ρ a ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, ρ a = 0 indicates that h a and g a are completely uncorrelated and ρ a = 1 represents full correlation in a time slot. Similar to ρ a , the correlation between h r and g r can be measured by ρ r , which has a form similar to ρ a . Since wireless environments often change very slowly, it is reasonable to assume that the average values of ρ a and ρ r can be estimated via multiple prior measurements of the environment and a series of processes. Note that ρ a and ρ r represent the relationship between two ''spatial'' vectors, in contrast to the usual relationship between ''temporal'' signal vectors.
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Under the system model described above, the SNRs at Bob and Eve are given by
Considering the correlation, Eq. (7) is rewritten as
For slowly fading wiretap channels, we use the secrecy outage probability to evaluate the secrecy performance of the system. We characterize the outage probability as
where R s denotes the target secrecy rate and C s represents the secrecy capacity, which is given by
Our objective is to minimize the secrecy outage probability. The problem is formulated as
III. IMPROVING SECRECY UNDER HIGH CORRELATION
In PHY-security, beamforming is employed to enhance the signal quality at Bob while limiting the signal strength at Eve. In contrast, AN techniques can be used to degrade the reception at Eve to increase the signal quality difference between Bob and Eve. In this paper, h a and g a are assumed to be highly correlated with a small channel difference between them. Thus, the achievable secrecy performance is unsatisfactory through using beamforming and AN at Alice. Additionally, the excessively large signal power does not help to improve the secrecy capacity substantially [12] . To overcome this disadvantage, we use a cooperative jamming relay in favorable channel conditions to degrade the reception at Eve more effectively. Although Eve could attempt to mitigate the interference signal from Relay using a directional antenna, g a can be significantly changed accordingly to amplify the difference between h a and g a . In such a case, the difficulty caused by the high correlation between the signals received at Bob and Eve disappears; therefore, this case is not considered. In the following, we try to solve the optimization problem for the proposed scheme of cooperative jamming relay, as given in Eq. (11) . For comparison, the traditional scheme of AN-aided beamforming is also investigated.
A. PROPOSED SCHEME OF COOPERATIVE JAMMING RELAY
According to the Markov inequality,
where E [·] denotes the mathematical expectation. Thus, the problem of minimizing the secrecy outage probability under the target secrecy rate R s can be approximately transformed into
where
with
In order to solve Problem (13), we need to compute E [C w ] first. Considering that g a ∼ CN (0, σ 2 ae I) and g r ∼ CN (0, σ 2 re I), it is not difficult to find that |g a | 2 and |g r | 2 both follow Gamma distributions and the probability density function (PDF) satisfies
where σ 2 and n denote the involved variance and the number of antennas corresponding to |g a | 2 or |g r | 2 , respectively. Moreover, |g a | 2 and |g r | 2 are completely independent of one another. Thus,
In Eq. (18), we use the formula [26] ∞
whereby the exponential integral of the order is
Through Eq. (18), it becomes easier to obtain the solution to E [C w ] via numerical methods, although we are still unable to obtain a closed-form solution.
At low δ e with small θ , we can use the approximation
and therefore E [C w ] is given by Compute C m ;
11:
θ * ← θ;
15:
θ ← θ + ι;
16:
until θ > 1 17:
if C s < R s then 19 : 
Since Problem (13) is a single-variable nonconvex optimization problem, we can perform a one-dimensional line search to find the optimal θ without solving it analytically. In the process, E [C w ] can be obtained at smaller θ through Eq. (22), while numerical methods are used with the assistance of Eq. (18) at larger θ. Based on this, the suboptimal secrecy outage probability p out (R s ) can be achieved by selecting the optimal θ . The procedure of our proposed scheme of cooperative jamming relay is summarized in Algorithm 1. Note that we use the average values of ρ a and ρ r as their input instead of the instantaneous values in Algorithm 1. The reason is that the average values can reflect the correlation more precisely. The computational complexity of this algorithm is O n 2 , making it quick to execute.
B. TRADITIONAL SCHEME OF AN-AIDED BEAMFORMING AT ALICE
When the level of correlation between the main and wiretap channels is very high, the traditional scheme in which Alice simultaneously transmits an information-bearing signal and AN is unsatisfactory for improving the secrecy performance. In this subsection, we discuss to what degree the traditional AN-aid beamforming scheme at Alice can reduce the secrecy outage probability under our correlation model. When the information-bearing signal is directed towards Bob and AN is inserted into the null space of h a , the SNR at Bob is the same as Eq. (6), and that at Eve is given by
When the goal is to minimize the secrecy outage probability under the secrecy outage constraint, the optimization problem for the traditional scheme can be solved similar to the proposed scheme of cooperative jamming relay. It is not difficult to find that the only difference is the solution to E [C w ]. In the following, we compute E [C w ] for the traditional scheme. Let
Then
In Eq. (26), we use Eqs. (19) and (20) . For the traditional scheme in which Alice simultaneously transmits an information-bearing signal and AN, the secrecy outage probability can be obtained similar to our proposed scheme of cooperative jamming relay. From Eq. (24), we observe that E [C w ] declines sharply with ρ a increasing. As a result, the secrecy outage probability becomes greater. The procedure is summarized in Algorithm 2. The computational complexity of this algorithm is also O n 2 , making it quick to execute.
C. ADVANTAGES OF COOPERATIVE JAMMING RELAY
Compared to the traditional scheme, the proposed scheme of cooperative jamming relay can provide three benefits: 1) the distance from Relay to Eve is far less than that between Alice and Eve; thus, the power consumption over travel paths is lower; 2) by deploying Relay reasonably, the correlation between the channels from Relay to Bob and Eve can be much below that between the main and wiretap channels, which guarantees high jamming efficiency; 3) the equipment complexity at Alice is significantly reduced. Compute C m ;
Algorithm 2 Traditional Scheme of AN-Aided Beamforming
8:
12:
13:
until θ > 1 14: Compute C s = C m − C w when θ ← θ * ; 15: if C s < R s then 16 :
17:
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, computer simulations are performed to evaluate the secrecy performance achieved by our proposed scheme of cooperative jamming relay. We start by investigating how the square of the correlation coefficient between the main and wiretap channels affects the secrecy outage probability; the traditional scheme employing beamforming and AN at Alice is presented for comparison. Then, we present the secrecy outage probability with respect to the total transmitted power. Finally, the secrecy outage probability versus the target secrecy rate R s is given.
A. P out VERSUS ρ 2
Here, we discuss the relationship between the secrecy outage probability and the correlation coefficient. Some of the parameters in the simulations are set as follows: the total transmitted power P is 3 dB; the target secrecy rate R s is 0 bps/Hz since we do not focus on a specific communication in practice; ρ 2 r is set to 0.5; the additive noise at Bob and Eve is assumed to be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and is drawn from a complex Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit variance; the variances of h a and g a , which are related to the path loss depending on the distance, are both σ 2 ab = σ 2 ae = 1/2 because Bob and Eve are very close. Note that because of the normalized noise power, the total transmitted power can be measured in dB. Fig. 2 plots the relationship between the secrecy outage probability P out and the square of the correlation coefficient between the main and wiretap channels ρ 2 a .
FIGURE 2.
Relationship between the secrecy outage probability P out and the square of the correlation coefficient between the main and wiretap channels ρ 2 a .
Generally, the distance from Relay to Bob is shorter than that from Alice to Bob; therefore, the path loss between Relay and Bob is less than that between Alice and Bob, which can be modeled as σ 2 rb > σ 2 ab . However, to exclude the benefit of the shorter distance between Relay and Bob and to focus on the effects of introducing a cooperative jamming relay, we intentionally set σ 2 rb = σ 2 ab to ensure an equivalent path loss. In addition, we set σ 2 rb = σ 2 re because Bob and Eve are very close. Fig. 2 presents three cases whereby the number of antennas at Alice is N a = 2, 4, or 8 and the number of antennas at Relay is N r = 2. Fig. 2 clearly shows that the secrecy outage probability depends strongly on ρ 2 a . When ρ 2 a is very large, the secrecy outage probability is also large. In the extreme case in which h a and g a are completely collinear, i.e., ρ 2 a = 1, the secrecy outage probability is approximately 0.63 and depends on only |h a | and |g a |. The secrecy outage probability is not 0.5 because the optimal power allocation ratio between Alice and Relay is selected based on the instantaneous secrecy capacity rather than the secrecy outage probability. The proposed scheme of cooperative jamming relay has a lower secrecy outage probability than that of the traditional scheme without such a relay in the high-ρ 2 a regime for each case, which indicates that the secrecy loss due to high correlation can be significantly reduced by using a cooperative jamming relay. However, the performance gains of our proposed scheme in the low ρ 2 a regime are not obvious, possibly because the secrecy capacity for our proposed scheme is determined jointly by g a and g r , and only their statistical information is known. In contrast, the secrecy capacity for the traditional scheme depends on only the statistical information of g a . As N a increases, the control of the secrecy outage probability improves, which can be accounted for by the dependence of the Gamma distribution on N a . Fig. 3 presents the secrecy outage probability P out versus the square of the correlation coefficient between the main and wiretap channels ρ 2 a for σ 2 rb = σ 2 re = 1/2 and σ 2 rb = σ 2 re = 1. This simulation is conducted to verify that the shorter distance between Relay and Bob provides additional secrecy gains. Fig. 3 presents three cases, in which the number of antennas at Alice is N a = 2, 4, or 8 and the number of antennas at Relay is N r = 2. The secrecy performance at larger σ 2 rb and σ 2 re is better than that at smaller σ 2 rb and σ 2 re because larger σ 2 rb and σ 2 re represent a shorter distance and smaller path loss, which can help to ensure that power is used more effectively. Fig. 4 shows the secrecy outage probability P out with respect to the square of the correlation coefficient between the main and wiretap channels ρ 2 a , where the number of antennas at Relay is N r = 2, 4, or 8 and the number of antennas at Alice is N a = 8. Moreover, we set σ 2 ab = σ 2 ae = σ 2 rb = σ 2 re = 1/2 to remove the secrecy gains due to reduced path loss. Our proposed scheme with the cooperative jamming relay has a much lower P out than that of the traditional scheme in each case (N r = 2, 4 and 8). Compared to the cases of N r = 2 and 4, for N r = 8, the value of P out is the lowest, with the FIGURE 5. Relationship between the secrecy outage probability P out and the total transmitted power P(dB) in the case of ρ 2 a = 0.9 and R s = 0 bps/Hz. same ρ 2 a , which means that the use of more antennas at Relay improves the secrecy. Moreover, the secrecy gains achieved by equipping more antennas at Relay are more obvious at high ρ 2 a than those at low ρ 2 a .
B. P out VERSUS P
In this subsection, we discuss the relationship between the secrecy outage probability and the total transmitted power. Some of the parameters in the simulations are set as follows: the target secrecy rate R s is 0 bps/Hz; ρ 2 r is set to 0.5; the additive noise at Bob and Eve is i.i.d. and drawn from a complex Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit variance; the variances of h a , g a , h r and g r are set as σ 2 ab = σ 2 ae = σ 2 rb = σ 2 re = 1/2 to eliminate the secrecy gains due to reduced path loss. Fig. 5 plots the relationship between the secrecy outage probability P out and the total transmitted power P (dB) when ρ 2 a = 0.9 and R s = 0 bps/Hz. Fig. 5 presents three cases, where the number of antennas at Alice is N a = 2, 4, or 8 and the number of antennas at Relay is N r = 2. High power plays an important role in reducing P out and facilitating secrecy, which is consistent with our experience and knowledge. However, in the traditional scheme, very large P is required to obtain low P out . In contrast, the utilization of P in our proposed scheme with a cooperative jamming relay is more efficient, which significantly decreases power consumption. In the extreme case of ρ 2 a = 1, the secrecy outage probability for the traditional scheme remains almost unchanged as P increases, whereas our proposed scheme has a distinct advantage, as shown in Fig. 6 . This result confirms that our proposed scheme of introducing a cooperative jamming relay plays an irreplaceable role in promoting secrecy at high ρ 2 a . Fig. 7 shows the secrecy outage probability P out with respect to the total transmitted power P (dB) in the case of ρ 2 a = 0.9 and R s = 0 bps/Hz, where the number of antennas at Relay is N r = 2, 4, or 8 and the number of antennas at Alice FIGURE 6. Relationship between the secrecy outage probability P out and the total transmitted power P(dB) in the case of ρ 2 a = 1 and R s = 0 bps/Hz. FIGURE 7. Secrecy outage probability P out with respect to the total transmitted power P (dB) in the case of ρ 2 a = 0.9 and R s = 0 bps/Hz.
is N a = 8. Our proposed scheme with a cooperative jamming relay has a much lower P out than that of the traditional scheme in each case (N r = 2, 4 and 8). Compared to the cases of N r = 2 and 4, for N r = 8, the value of P out , for the same ρ 2 a , is the lowest, which means that more antennas at Relay can help improve the secrecy.
C. P out VERSUS R s
Here, we discuss the relationship between the secrecy outage probability and the target secrecy rate R s . Some of the parameters in the simulations are set as follows: the total transmitted power P is 3 dB; the square of the correlation coefficient between the main and wiretap channels is ρ 2 a = 0.9; ρ 2 r is set to 0.5; the additive noise at Bob and Eve is assumed to be i.i.d. and drawn from a complex Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit variance; the variances of h a , g a , h r and g r are set to σ 2 ab = σ 2 ae = σ 2 rb = σ 2 re = 1/2 to eliminate the secrecy gains due to path loss. Fig. 8 plots the relationship between the secrecy outage probability P out and the target secrecy rate R s in the case FIGURE 8. Relationship between the secrecy outage probability P out and the target secrecy rate R s in the case of ρ 2 a = 0.9 and P = 3 dB.
FIGURE 9.
Relationship between the secrecy outage probability P out and the target secrecy rate R s in the case of ρ 2 a = 0.9 and P = 3 dB.
of ρ 2 a = 0.9 and P = 3 dB. Fig. 8 presents three cases, in which the number of antennas at Alice is N a = 2, 4, or 8 and the number of antennas at Relay is N r = 2. We observe that an increase in R s causes a rapid increase in P out , which conforms to practical secrecy communications. When R s is very large, e.g., R s = 1 bps/Hz, P out approaches 1, which indicates that secret communications are almost impossible to achieve. Our proposed scheme with a cooperative jamming relay has a lower P out than that of the traditional scheme in each case (N a = 2, 4 and 8), especially in the low R s regime. However, when R s is very large, both our proposed scheme and the traditional scheme have a very high P out . In contrast, in the low-R s regime, compared to the cases of N a = 2 and 4, for N a = 8, the value of P out , for the same R s , is the lowest. However, in the high-R s regime, an increase in the number of antennas at Alice results in high P out . Fig. 9 shows the secrecy outage probability P out with respect to the target secrecy rate R s in the case of ρ 2 a = 0.9 and P = 3 dB, where the number of antennas at Relay is N r = 2, 4, or 8 and the number of antennas at Alice is N a = 8. Our proposed scheme with a cooperative jamming relay has a much lower P out than that of the traditional scheme, especially in the low-R s regime. Three cases (N r = 2, 4 and 8) are considered in our proposed scheme. As shown in Fig. 9 , the values of P out for the three cases at the same R s are similar. Therefore, the secrecy performance receives minimal benefit from additional antennas at Relay, and only a small gain is achieved at low R s .
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the secrecy performance in the situation in which the main and wiretap channels are highly correlated. Due to the high correlation, the secrecy suffers significant loss, which is difficult to effectively mitigate by employing AN-aided beamforming techniques at Alice. In response to this challenging issue, we propose an ingenious scheme in which a cooperative jamming relay is introduced to facilitate confidential transmission. By reasonably deploying the cooperative jamming relay, AN from the relay can effectively degrade the reception at the eavesdropper. According to the simulations, the traditional scheme of AN-aided beamforming at Alice suffers from high correlation more often than our proposed scheme. Moreover, adding antennas at Alice and Relay facilitates secrecy at moderate total transmitted power levels and target secrecy rates. These results indicate that our scheme of introducing a cooperative jamming relay achieves significant performance gain in terms of the secrecy outage probability. 
